Anti-corruption drives and a new 'corruption paradigm' have figured prominently in the reconstitution of political order in Europe's postcommunist states, under strong pressure from the international financial institutions and the European Union. Now that data on corruption are systematically collected, measured and monitored, it is both possible and essential to step back and assess what these data reveal, conceal or omit. This paper articulates and provides a critique of the assumptions, preconceptions and methodology implicit in the prevailing 'corruption paradigm'.
It is important to note that, if those involved in corrupt practices are at all present in such analytical frameworks, more often than not these 'deviants' are not, conceptually, given a voice. Most anthropologists object to such approaches and take pains not to follow the economists' path of evaluating actual practices against 'capitalism,' but must be understood first and foremost on their own terms (Caldwell 2004; Grant 1995; Ledeneva 1998 Ledeneva , 2006 Ries 1997; Rivkin-Fish 2005) . These bottom-up accounts need to be distinguished from the views of "revisionists" who highlight the potential benefits of corruption, as well as its "functionality", driven by a necessity to lubricate an overly rigid political or bureaucratic regime (Girling, 1997) . Michael Johnston identifies practices that link people and groups into lasting networks of exchange and shared interest as "integrative" corrupt exchanges (1986: 460) . Depending on perspective, informal networks are associated with trust based on relationships, mutual obligations and power of informal norms (bottom up); or trust betrayed by the agents who bend or break formal rules set out by the principal (topdown). The discrepancy between formal rules and informal norms has become an important dimension in neo-institutionalist analyses undertaken since the publication of North (1990) (these include: Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Lauth 2004; and Krastev 2004, 2005 ). Yet empirical research concentrates largely on the measurement of corruption, again on the premise of the normative perspective outlined above.
Assumption Two: Measurement
The second assumption of the corruption paradigm is that corruption can be measured. Even though there is no universal measure of corruption, attempts to Indices based on business surveys help us to understand the administrative corruption that occurs between commercial enterprises and public officials. They can be used, for example, to test the hypothesis that increasing civil servants' pay will lead to less bribe-seeking in the process of policy making, or for assessing the effectiveness of policies. However, they say little about state capture. index, drawing on 17 surveys from 13 independent institutions, which has gathered the opinions of businesspeople and country analysts. Because they combine information from various sources, these indices can include a larger number of countries than those in each particular set of data.
In Table 1 importance and includes some extra data like that provided by the ICRG, for example.
The WBI's Control of Corruption Index was created to improve on the CPI by providing a corruption ranking for every country for which at least one source of data was available, and by calculating its margin of error more precisely. It also strives to weigh its sources objectively by attaching more importance to indices that correlate to one another.
Nevertheless, despite these efforts, there are many faults in all these indices that undermine both the validity and relevance of the measurements. Knack warns that this problem is exacerbated further by the fact that these measurements were designed to create an awareness of the problem of corruption, yet they have subsequently been used for policy-making without the requisite re-evaluation needed for this new role.
Assumption Three: Policy-Making
Related to the idea of the core importance of measurement is the third assumptionthe belief that the measurement of corruption, considered amongst other governance indicators 8 , can be translated into policy. In fact, policy formation can be viewed in stages: the measurements produce stimuli and inform policies internationally; national political leadership is thus persuaded to implement policies; and institutional frameworks (the rules of the game) are reformed by these policies. It is the explicit expectation of the paradigm that compliance with recommended policies will result in an improved record for these countries in the existing ranks, indices and indicators. One of the problems associated with the policy reform that has come about as a result of observing corruption measurement indices is related to the fact that measurement is undertaken by international organisations. Consequently, policies are devised (or at least strongly influenced) at the supranational level, without giving specific attention to the background and culture of the societies that implement these policies (Stiglitz 2002 ). The assumption is that political will suffices to launch the process. The pressure of international organisations on governments to pursue an anticorruption course is viewed as part and parcel of globalisation, which is associated with prescribed norms of good governance and policies imported into a country in exchange for closer integration into the world community.
During the 1990s there was a shift in international official terminology from the 'fight against corruption' to the discourse of 'good governance'. This signified an important development in policy formation: corruption, once viewed as a disease to be treated, was increasingly being diagnosed as one of the symptoms of a struggling system of governance whose problems need to be addressed by a wider set of measures. International organisations and NGOs not only became interested in understanding both the formal and informal aspects of the institutional frameworks whose consequences for policies and procedures were capable of addressing their defects, but were also prompted to search for positive incentives for tackling the issues generated by corruption. Effective policy-making should reduce the dependence of the system of governance on non-transparent practices and create incentives and initiatives on the ground as well as reforms from above, such as responsible leadership and the political will to tackle corruption. Similarly, in academia, a noticeable turn from corruption to the themes of honesty, integrity and trust has recently taken place. 9 Such a shift is necessary, but not sufficient in itself since governments also need motives and incentives to adopt the designated policies.
Before discussing the issues of policy and policy implementation, one must question Consequently, policies based on these measurements are not as successful as expected. Let me consider these points in more detail.
Problems of Definition
As previously mentioned, corruption is a fairly recent concept and can only be 10 Some governments have sold offices to raise money. This was true, for example, of judicial positions in 18th century France and of commissions in the army and navy in most European countries in the 19th century. As the vested rights of office holders were an obstacle to reorganization and an impediment to efficiency they were bought out or expropriated with compensation.
Federico Varese observes that in countries with pervasive corruption, where corruption is a norm, the very notion of corruption itself becomes meaningless: anticorruption campaigns are used manipulatively and perceived with suspicion, and the overall perception of corruption is likely to be distorted (Varese 2000: 99-100 ). In such a climate any anti-corruption programme is hard to implement. Pippidi observes that since the communist regimes were dismantled in Central and Eastern Europe, they have attempted to make the transition from a particularistic system to a universalistic one, but have so far only reached a stage which she calls 'competitive particularism'. She argues that at this point countries are hybrids between the two above-mentioned poles, with the distinction between public and private remaining blurred. At the same time, society's record of corruption does not improve, while the decreased public acceptance of corruption results in increased dissatisfaction with the system and democratisation. 11 Kornai's analysis of disappointment amongst postcommunist populations, even in successful transitional societies, illustrates not only a shifting frame of reference-new members of the European Union compare themselves to old members rather than Russia or other former Soviet countries-but also points to a continuation of people being dissociated from the 'system,' to the distrust of public institutions, and correspondingly to the low rates of participation in civil society (Kornai 2006) . Given that no society operates without trust, these forms of disappointment and distrust of 'officialdom' highlight the alternative forms of trust, associated with the use of informal networks and the spread of informal practices, that 11 There is plenty of evidence that anti-corruption campaigns are used manipulatively to prosecute political opposition, to gain advantage over business competitors, to achieve visibility and positive image in the international ratings and to satisfy conditionalities of the funds that can be further embezzled and to pursue other tactic driven goals (Ledeneva 2003) . Such policies do not necessarily enhance the governance pattern but may change position of the countries in the international rankings.
continue to operate or emerge in order to create and redistribute wealth within the European Union and globally as well as to serve the so-called remittance economies. Secondly, the sources used in the compilation of the indices are not always totally independent of each other. Knack mentions that the respondents in expert surveys might consult publicly available information about corruption before logging their own answers in order to provide 'better' responses. Previous studies therefore have an impact on their answers, which reduces their neutrality. The CPIA even adjusts its final ratings to be more in line with other indices and the WBI weights its component sources according to their agreement with others. This is based on the assumption that if one source differs substantially from the majority of others it is inaccurate. As Knack points out, this assumption is made on the basis that the majority of indices are independent of each other, which they are not. To support his point, he highlights the probability that the EIU is based on the WEF and that the ICRG seems correlated to the TI. What complicates this problem even further is that it is impossible to determine the precise extent to which the different sources are interdependent.
Therefore, the WBI weighting of its constituent sources could be inadvertently distorted by this interdependence and more weight than intended could be given to one source as its correlation to another is unclear.
Thirdly, it is sometimes difficult to compare even the same index for one country over time or for different countries in the same year. This is due to the fact that the compilation methodologies change after a few years and that it is not always feasible to use qualitatively similar sources in all countries. The CPIA's criteria, for instance, are revised after a number of years and the TI's components also change with time. What does it mean that China is ranked number 71 with a score of 3.4, while the UK is ranked number 11 with a score of 8.6? The lack of a standardized approach to estimating the level of corruption makes it difficult to know whether the rankings reflect the number of transactions affected by corruption, legal or illegal activities, the level of bribes or the cost to society (Soreide, 2006: 3) .
Although the TI publishes the margins of error, these "error bands" are usually in an order of magnitude higher than the precision in the ranking. 
Problems with Policy-Making
For both the scholarly and policymaking communities, the so-called "no predisposition" outlook has become the foundation of the 'can-do' approach to anticorruption campaigns. The view that some cultures are more predisposed to corruption than others and that some countries are historically locked into dependence on corrupt practices is 'politically incorrect' and the shift in academic argument reflects this. Thomas Carothers (2002) questions the 'can-do' approach in his critique of the 'any country can become a democracy' attitude. He argues that a country's background-economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, socio-cultural traditions, and other "structural" features-constitute important factors in the success of democratisation. Such structural features were analysed by Daniel Treisman (2000) , who endeavors to explain why corruption is perceived to be more widespread in some countries than in others in relation to particular historical and cultural traditions, levels of economic development, political institutions and government policies. He finds that index-based evidence supports the following conclusions: countries with Protestant traditions, histories of British rule, more developed economies, and (probably) higher imports were less 'corrupt;' federal states were more 'corrupt;' long exposure to democracy predicted lower corruption, while the current degree of democracy was not significant. Perception of corruption is assumed to be correlated to corruption here as well.
Which options are open to those countries that score low on all of those criteria? In her effort to explain why anti-corruption reforms fail in the postcommunist environment, Pippidi suggests that in order to determine the development stage of a country and to design the anti-corruption campaign accordingly, the following questions must be answered: 1) Are the power holders clearly identifiable and do they
give government contracts and access to the media mainly to themselves and their relatives? 2) Do the same groups of society always lose out on lucrative opportunities Dissemination of universalist norms is one of the key policies that Pippidi suggests need to be implemented in order to reduce bribe taking and to make semi-particularist countries more universalist and democratic, but it can only be achieved by displacing or replacing the particularist norms. This means the policy must be informed on these norms, designed with local expertise, and implemented with cooperation at the grassroots level. Rather than assuming as given, particular incentives that could motivate this particular society to become clean(er) must be identified (Nield 2002); particular actors (movements) are to be made responsible for the success in overcoming corruption (Pippidi 2006) ; and powers to implement these policies delegated to them (Schmidt 2007) .
In conclusion, it is important to turn away from the critique of underlying assumptions of the corruption paradigm to the ways in which postcommunist experience could contribute to it. From an historical perspective, efforts to assess the progress of anticorruption measures in the postcommunist countries are premature, considering how long it took mature democracies to clean up their governance-a process that itself is far from completion. Good governance is not an achievable goal, but an uneven process that the so-called 'transitional countries' launched together with their democratisation projects. As Carothers shows in the analysis of the grey zone of democratisation, the political situation in the 'transitional countries' varies noticeably Given that there might not be a single message coming from the postcommunist countries, it's essential to conceptualise local and regional practices at the grassroots level and integrate them into the global frame of reference. Karklins has identified the "system made me do it" effect in her recent account of postcommunist corruption but has included it to stand alongside other types of corruption (Karklins 2005 ; see the typology). Understanding informal practices as responses to the 'injustice' and 'unfairness' of the system is essential for reassessing correlation between corrupt practices at the grassroots and those at the top. Petty corruption, or the 'system made me do it' behaviour, should be given special attention in measurements and comparisons as forms of behaviour that are most widespread and local in nature. The term 'petty' is misleading, as the change in attitudes to corruption at the grassroots level is the key to every anti-corruption reform. Grassroots practices should be understood in their own terms. They are often a response to oppressive regulations and a form of collective whistle blowing-indicators of administrative corruption, rather than its part. The significance of local framing should be emphasized: it may be different from the 'corruption paradigm.' Thus, in certain contexts, anti-corruption campaigns should be treated with suspicion, and informal practices should be viewed as driven by belief in their legitimacy and as having an equalising effect on societies.
In theoretical terms, the corruption paradigm that emerged in the 1990s has to be disaggregated in order to accommodate the new or altered informal practices which have developed since the end of communist rule. In empirical terms, such a disaggregation will take care of the fundamental mismatch between the corruption paradigm and the local experience crucial for building effective anti-corruption policies in the future.
